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PRIVATIZATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND
RELIANCE
John E. Rhea*
INTRODUCTION
Since the discovery of oil, world power brokers have fought over the price,
production, and control of the once vast and still vital natural resource.' Some
allege that the recent occupation of Iraq is motivated by the control over oil
supplies in the Persian Gulf.2 This view suggests that recent military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq are in truth, strategic precursors for the eminent wars to
procure oil.3  Yet, the critical discussion, in this writer's opinion, should
contemplate how the world will function without oil and how civilization will
come to terms with the fact that fossil fuels as an energy resource are no longer an
4inexhaustible resource. In the very near future the world will experience an
energy crisis and a shock to economic systems much like that experienced in
the1970s and mid-1980s. Only this time, the end of production will not be the
result of any unilateral exercise of sovereign power. Instead, the crisis will result
from an actual worldwide depletion of fossil fuel resources. Some predict that
petroleum 5 resources will peak by the year 20206 and that by the year 2080,
* John Rhea received his Juris Doctor from the University of Denver, Sturm College of Law in May
2005.
1. See generally DANIEL YERG[N, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER
(1991). Daniel Yergin's THE PRIZE, is widely known as one of the most prolific accounts of the power,
politics, and economics that has existed within the petroleum industry since its inception. Yergin
provides a comprehensive overview of petroleum explorations and the interactions between
governments and multinational companies. Yergin's book also provides an in-depth analysis of
petroleum price and production and its impact domestic and international policies.
2. F. William Engdahl, Iraq and the Problem of Peak Oil, at
http://www.spinninglobe.net/iraq&oil.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2005); see also Matt Savinar, Life After
the Oil Crash: Deal With Reality Or Reality Will Deal With You (Dec. 1, 2004), available at
http://www/lifeaftertheoilcrash.net/.
3. Engdahl, supra note 2; see also Savinar, supra note 2.
4. Tim Appenzeller, The End of Cheap Oil, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, June 2004 at 80, 85, 88.
5. For purposes of this discussion, "petroleum" refers crude oil and natural gas. The petroleum
industry is also referred to as the "oil and gas industry." The term is synonymous with fossil fuels,
hydrocarbons, and non-renewable resources. But in the international energy context, petroleum
primarily refers to oil and gas.
6. Geological surveys, according to THE WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, estimate that oil production
will peak in either 2010 or 2020, resulting in 2.3 trillion barrels of recoverable reserves. See THE
WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, 44-148 (Int'l. Energy Agency ed.,1998) reprinted in ERNEST SMITH ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTION 18, 19 (2d ed.2000); see also, Appenzeller, supra note 4,
at 90.
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petroleum resources will be completely exhausted.7 The grim reality that crude oil
is indeed a finite resource places a real threat to the way of life of developed
countries and will drastically impair world economies. Currently, the world
consumes over thirty billion barrels of oil per day (bpd).5 The United States alone
consumes approximately ten billion bpd9 and by 2025, U.S. consumption is
expected to balloon to nearly thirty-five billion bpd.' ° As world populations and
demand grow at a faster rate than production, the global energy outlook becomes
disastrous.
Dr. M. King Hubbert, discussed infra, alerted the world in 1950 that
petroleum was a finite resource and that the production of conventional oil would
reach its peak between 1970 and 1980." At which point we would have used half
of all the recoverable oil that ever existed on our planet. 12  This alarming
information has likely been known to previous administrations. Surely the Bush
Administration, through the eyes of Vice President, Dick Cheney, is well aware of
the impending crisis. 13 For instance, Cheney, a former Halliburton executive,
stated during a speech to the International Petroleum Institute in 1999 that: "by the
year 2010 we [the world] will need on the order of an additional 50 million bpd."'
14
It is further estimated that by 2020 the world will require 120 billion bpd for
economic growth.' 5 Rather frighteningly, for oil-dependent countries, a mere 10 to
15 percent shortfall between demand and supply can trigger an enormous
economic crisis. 16 In short, in apocalyptic fashion, life as we know it will cease as
world oil supplies come to an end.
Be clear that there is no feasible replacement for oil. An end to world reliance
on fossil fuel based energy in the form of renewable energy or other alternative
energy sources is at best a supplement but more realistically a theoretical fantasy.
In most cases, oil is required to develop these alternatives to oil.' 7 For example, oil
is required in the mining and extraction of the hard rock minerals required to
7. See generally THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIs, THE HUBBERT PEAK FOR WORLD OIL,
available at htttp://www.oilcrisis.con/summary.htm (last updated Dec. 22, 2003) [hereinafter THE
COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, PEAK OIL]; see also THE COMING GLOBAL OIL CRISIS M. KING HUBBERT:
HUBBERT PEAK OF OIL PRODUCTION, available at http://www.hubertpeak.com/hubbert/ (last visited
June 3, 2005) [hereinafter THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, HUBBERT PEAK]; see also A
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN BOOK, ENERGY AND POWER 39 (1971).
8. Savinar, supra note 2.
9. bpd references the phrase, "barrels per day."
10. Savinar supra note 2; see also, THE WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 6, at 18-19.
11. THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, PEAK OIL, supra note 7; see also THE COMING OF GLOBAL
CRISIS, HUBBERT PEAK, supra note 7. Other scholars, including Dr. C.J. Campbell predicted that world
depletion would begin in 1999. See THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, PEAK OIL, supra note 7.
12. THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, PEAK OIL, supra note 7; see also THE COMING OF GLOBAL
CRISIS, HUBBERT PEAK, supra note 7.
13. See Engdahl supra note 2.
14. Dick Cheney's Speech to the International Petroleum Institute in London reprinted in
Engdahl, supra note 2.
15. Savinar, supra note 2.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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develop solar power. 18 Moreover, recovering "oil" from oil shale also requires the
use of crude oil to convert the oil shale into a usable product. 19 Additionally, the
promise offered by fuel cells is questionable due to limited global reserves of
platinum.20  Thus, despite efforts to develop alternative energy resources,
petroleum remains the world's primary source of energy.2'
In this writer's view, energy companies, heads of states, and the major power
brokers of the primary consuming countries, should realize that reliance on oil
suppliers with hidden political agendas and narcissistic international policies like
those of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, can no longer be entrusted to bear the
sole key to the future of the energy market place.
It is not surprising that, in the last three decades, strategic efforts have
commenced to globalize the petroleum industry under the auspices of privatization.
Hence, privatization of the international petroleum industry serves as an economic
alternative to the power and control exercised by producing nations over this vital
commodity. In that sense, by privatizing the petroleum industry, multinationals
and importing nations, regained control over the world energy market.
Several theories account for the rationale behind the privatization of the
international petroleum industry, most of which propose that the decline in
socialist regimes and profit maximization are the driving forces behind energy
privatization trends. This writer contends, however, that two political and
economic factors drive global petroleum privatization. First, and arguably the
most significant driving force behind the privatization of the international
petroleum industry, is the need for consuming countries to decrease their reliance
on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)23 and the Middle
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting Dr. Walter Youngquist, who further contends that oil derived from oil shale is not
actually crude oil).
20. Savinar theorizes that a single hydrogen fuel cell require 20 grams of platinum. With only 7.7
billion grams of proven platinum reserves, the approximate 700 million internal combustion engines on
the road today, would require annual replacement, excessive costs, and would become exhausted in a
relatively short period of time. Savinar, supra note 2; but see William Vincent, Hydrogen & Tort Law:
Liability Concerns Are Not A Bar to Hydrogen Economy, 25.2 ENERGY LAW JOURNAL 385, (2004).
Vincent espouses that hydrogen is the most abundant element in the universe and hence hydrogen fuel
cells will ultimately become a common fuel source.
21. Alternative energy such as nuclear power, solar energy, and hydro- power do not have the
present capacity to replace petroleum resources as the primary energy needed to generate electricity
fuels and automobiles worldwide. ERNEST SMITH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTION
4 (2d ed. 2000); see also WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, SURVEY OF ENERGY RESOURCES: CRUDE OIL AND
NATURAL GAS LIQUIDS (2001) at http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-
geis/publications/reports/ser/oil/oil.asp (last visited Apr.5, 2005).
22. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, PRIVATIZATION AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF
ENERGY MARKETS 3 (1996), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/financial/060996.pdf
[hereinafter GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY MARKETS].
23. OPEC is the acronym for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; the 11 member
countries are: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Venezuela, Nigeria, Indonesia, Libya, Algeria, Qatar,
and the United Arab Emirates. OPEC, THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING
COUNTRIES (OPEC) BRIEF HISTORY, at http://www.opec.org/aboutus/history/history.htm (last visited
Apr. 5, 2005).
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East. By developing foreign investment activities with Non-OPEC producers,
western entities exercise greater control and participation in the market, thereby
stabilizing the market, increasing capital revenue, and securing future economic
growth. Second, is the economic disparity within the petroleum producing
countries, which consists of three sub-factors: the absence of economic diversity,
the economic burden of external debt owed by host countries, and primarily, the
exclusive economic reliance on petroleum revenue by producing nations.
Historically, the threat to the security of fossil fuel resources, as triggered by
the 1973 Saudi-led Oil Embargo, is significant in the analysis of privatization in
the international petroleum industry. Additionally, conflicts and unstable
government regimes in OPEC member nations are also considerable factors in the
surge to develop foreign direct investment (FDI) with non-OPEC producers. This
discussion attempts to demonstrate that privatization, in the international petroleum
sector, is a necessary vehicle to avoid reliance on OPEC and the Middle East. And
as such, it is a reflection of political strategies, aimed at securing rapidly depleting
energy resources. And secondly, that privatization is also an economic necessity
for producing countries whose excessive reliance on petroleum revenue has left
them vulnerable to the very foreign control which many anti-globalists protest.
This discussion begins with an analysis of importing nations' reliance on
foreign supplies. Next, a brief historical account of foreign investment in
petroleum producing countries follows, which includes the demise of the
traditional concessions and the shift of power over price and production. The
historical approach serves as insight into current anxieties surrounding reliance on
Middle Eastern oil.
Central to this discussion is the impact of the 1973 Oil Embargo and the
driving forces behind the modem trend of privatization in the world oil market and
the development of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) as a response to the formation of OPEC. The totality of
which resulted in the shift by consuming countries from reliance on OPEC member
countries as a means to economic stability. Finally, this article provides an
analysis of the economic disparity and economic reliance on petroleum revenue by
host countries, which ultimately makes those nation states more apt to seek foreign
direct investment as a means to spark economic growth.
I. PRIVATIZATION: A VEHICLE TO AVOID OPEC RELIANCE
A. Hubbert Peak Oil
Since much of this discussion references the end of fossil fuel resources and
the political and economic reactions thereof, adequate analysis of the transition
from state-owned enterprises to privatization, requires some treatment of the end of
the oil age. The Hubbert Peak or Peak Oil, as it is often referred, is a theory
developed by geologist, Dr. M. King Hubbert in the 1950s. 24 Hubbert's theory is
represented by a bell-shaped curve depicted on a typical linear graph. Hubbert
24. THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, PEAK OIL, supra note 7; see also THE COMING OF GLOBAL
CRISIS, HUBBERT PEAK, supra note 7.
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predicted that between the time of the first production of oil in 1860 and the end of
oil in 2050, a collision between world supply and world demand would result in a
peak of world oil supplies.25
The Hubbert Peak was estimated to occur between 1970 and 1980, whereby,
half of all proven reserves of conventional oil would have been used.26 Hubbert's
bell-curve demonstrates that when conventional oil has peaked, the total resources
that were ever and will ever be available for production will be known.27 Once the
peak occurs, production will decline until the resource is completely depleted.28
Although Hubbert's prediction that U.S. reserves would peak in the 1970s proved
to be accurate,29 new geophysical studies estimate that (globally) Peak Oil will
more likely occur in 2020.30
The World Energy Outlook estimates that ultimate recoverable reserves are
roughly 2.3 trillion barrels. 31 Dr. C.J. Campbell of Petroconsultants estimates that
the global ultimate is 1750 Gb. And since there haven't been any significant
discoveries in the past two decades, this means that after 2020, production will
begin its decline. Hence, for each year that world populations increase, the
possibilities of locating new accommodating supplies will become less and less
likely.
33
Is it possible then, that U.S. military activity in Iraq and Afghanistan is merely
a camouflage to ensure security over future energy resources? Several scholars
have proposed that the competition for world oil supplies will be carried out
through actual war.34 Such positions support the proposition that American
military instillations established during Desert Storm near Saudi Arabia, the
present occupation of Afghanistan, near the Caspian Sea, as well as the military
presence in Iraqi, are but preliminary maneuvers to prepare for the destined
military battles for the last drop of oil. 35 Since the aftermath of Peak Oil will likely
result in catastrophic global crisis,3 6 the argument for strategic military operations
may not be completely far fetched. However, a more practical theory, as this
discussion asserts, is that energy resource strategists opted for controlling
participation and influence over the global energy markets, in the form of
petroleum privatization.
25. See THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, HUBBERT PEAK, supra note 7.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. David Ross, Plan War and the Hubbert Oil Curve, ZMAG (May 2004), available at
http://www.zmagsite.zmag.org/May2004/ross0504.html.
30. THE WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 6 at 18-19.
31. Id.
32. THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, PEAK OIL, supra note 7; see also THE COMING OF GLOBAL
CRISIS, HUBBERT PEAK, supra note 7; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 20-22.
33. See Ross supra note 29, at 1.
34. See id. at 4; see also Engdahl, supra note 2; see also Savinar, supra note 2.
35. Ross, supra note 29.
36. See THE COMING OF GLOBAL CRISIS, PEAK OIL, supra note 7; see also THE COMING OF
GLOBAL CRISIS, HUBBERT PEAK, supra note 7.
2005
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
B. The History of Global Petroleum Transactions
This section attempts to shed light upon the historical factors which led to the
geopolitical conflicts between importing nations and exporting nations over
petroleum resources. Likewise, this section seeks to demonstrate that the historical
encounters between petroleum dependent states and producing states are the
fundamental mainspring for the modem trend toward petroleum privatization.
Privatization at its purest form can be traced back to the early exploration and
concession agreements beginning in the late 1800s with the Royal Dutch
Company. 37 The first concession agreement occurred in 1901 when William
D'Arcy was granted a concession agreement by the Shah of Persia to explore
500,000 square miles in search of oil.38 In 1925, D'Arcy's concession agreement
with Iraq became the model upon which future concession agreements were
based.39 During the first half of the twentieth century, seven multinational oil
companies known as the "Seven Sisters, set price and production levels providing
minimal control and low financial compensation for host countries." 0 Much like
modem privatization models, early concession agreements involved foreign capital
and technology used to explore and develop petroleum resources from passive host
country participants. Arguably, these contractual arrangements were
representative of the imbalance of power that persisted in the industry and in our
view, laid the foundation for future conflict between importing nations and
exporting nations.
C. The Demise of Concession Agreements
Following World War II, the shift of oil production from North America to
the Middle East began to define international roles between importer and exporter
nations.4 1 And as a growing demand for oil occurred in the United States, oil
became the greatest factor in Middle Eastern politics.
42
Although multinational companies continued to dominate the petroleum
industry between 1945 and 1971,43 gradually, a changing of the guards in the
international petroleum industry became eminent. The Joint Agreements between
the majors and the producing nations became extinct by 1984.44 The subsequent
loss of market share, once held by the seven multinationals, was accompanied by
37. ZHIGUO GAO, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CONTRACTS: CURRENT TRENDS AND NEW
DIRECTIONS 9 (1994).
38. See Ernest Smith, A Fifty Year Perspective on World Oil Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 13,
17-18 (1989).
39. GAO, supra note 37, at 9.
40. Id.
41. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, THE ARABS: PEOPLE AND POWER 189 (1978) [hereinafter THE
ARABS].
42. See id.
43. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD HISTORY, GLOBALIZATION OF MATERIAL LIFE 3 (2001),
available at http://www.bartleby.com/67/2640.html [hereinafter GLOBALIZATION OF MATERIAL LIFE].
44. Philip K. Verleger, The Long Term Implications of Oil as a Commodity, in WORLD ENERGY
MARKETS: STABILITY OR CYCLICAL CHANGE? 132 (William F.Thompson & David J.DeAngelo eds.
1985).
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the demise of joint producing agreements.45 Countries such as Qatar, Iraq, and
Kuwait, after acquiring technology and capital procured through their partnerships
with Western multinationals, began to rely less on foreign participation and began
to demand control over their natural resources.46 Adding to this dynamic was the
end of Colonialism and the exercise of sovereignty over a nation state's natural
resources. The U.N. General Assembly Resolution §1803 of 1963, providing for
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, gave nations a sense of self
reliance and dominion over their petroleum resources.47
The demise of the traditional concessions agreement began in the early 1940s
when producing countries became discontent with the existing arrangements of the
concessions agreements.4 8 In 1943 Venezuela began to impose taxes against the
petroleum countries in addition to receiving royalty payments. 49 In 1950, a profit
sharing agreement between Saudi Arabia and Arabian American Oil Company
(ARAMCO), gave Saudi Arabia 50 percent of the profits, as opposed to per-barrel
royalties. 50 In 1973, Saudi Arabia acquired 25 percent of ARAMCO, 60 percent in
1974 and full ownership in 1980.5'
The demise of the concessions agreement occurred mostly by negotiation, yet
in some cases producing countries regained control through expropriations or
nationalization.52 Consequently, by the late 1970s nearly all Middle Eastern oil
and petroleum resources in North and West Africa became nationalized or
otherwise state-owned.
53
D. The Birth of OPEC
Armed with U.N. sanctioned sovereignty over their petroleum resources and
liberated from exploitive concessions agreements, producing countries asserted
their influence over the world oil market. Producing countries sought to increase
revenue by increasing production rather than increasing the price of oil, while
multinationals sought to maintain prices.54 What ensued was a battle over what the
price should be and who should set that price. 55 This battle over the price and
45. Id.
46. See generally, THE ARABS, supra note 41; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 55-60.
47. G.A. Res.1803, U.N. GAOR,17th Sess., Supp. No.17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962)
(Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources); U.N. Resolution § 1803 as discussed in SMITH ET
AL., supra note 21, at 340, 342-343; see also GAO, supra note 37, at 17.
48. GAO, supra note 37, at 14, 17.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 15.
51. GLOBALIZATION OF MATERIAL LIFE, supra note 43, at 4.
52. GAO, supra note 37, at 18-19; see generally Stephen A. Zorn, Unilateral Action by Oil-
Producing Countries 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 63, 90-94 (1985-1986). Under President Cirdenas'
leadership, Mexico expropriated its petroleum sector and created PEMEX; see also SMITH ET AL., supra
note 21, at 386.
53. Michael Economides & George E. Kronman, The Role of Politics and Economics in
International Exploration and Production: Future Implications, in INTERNATIONAL OIL & GAS
VENTuRES: A BustNEss PERSPECTIVE, 41-42 (George E. Kronman, Don B. Felio & Thomas E.
O'Connor eds., 2000); see also GAO, supra note 37, at 17-19.
54. See generally YERG1N, supra note 1, at 514-23.
55. Id.
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production of oil culminated in the establishment of OPEC in 1960.56 Ironically,
America's Interstate Oil Compact of the 1930s became the model for OPEC price
and production policies.57 The primary goals of the five founding members of
OPEC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, and Venezuela, were to control price and
production levels. 58 By 1973, the Saudi-led OPEC entity had grown in power and
influence.59 This writer contends that with the major producing markets in the
Gulf region being state-owned, the Western countries feared the implications of
reliance on the Gulf region.
E. Western Reactions to Price and Production Wars
The "Oil Crisis" of 1973 and 1985 raised new anxiety to the already existing
power struggle between world powers and producing countries. For example, in
1973, in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War, Saudi Arabia reduced production
causing a decline in OPEC output. 60  Non-OPEC members capitalized on the
opportunity and created inflated "spot prices" making the price of oil increase
dramatically.6' Then in 1985, a Saudi-led OPEC flooded the market, making the
price of oil drop substantially. 62 Hence, the need to stabilize and diversify the
petroleum market became paramount. These events and their economic
implications, created the need to regain control over the petroleum industry
through privatization.
History reveals that in the last thirty years following the Saudi-led Oil
Embargo of 1973, there has been a surge toward privatization and exploration in
Non-OPEC markets.63 The 1973 Oil Embargo created a threat to the security and
future of fossil fuels as an energy resource throughout the world, and subsequently
justified a shift from market reliance on OPEC producers. Exploration and
production (E&P) investors vigorously began to develop new resources and new
E&P ventures in un-mature markets and with Non-OPEC members64 .
The Saudi Oil Embargo crippled the American economy and created an
almost permanent psychological fear of reliance on Middle Eastern oil. 65 In the
United States economic strategies diverted economic growth and led to economic
56. See BERNARD TAVERNE, PETROLEUM, INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
PETROLEUM REGULATION, ECONOMIES AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES,I 10-12 (1999); see also GAO,
supra note 37, at 17; see also Economides & Kronman, supra note 53, at 43.
57. YERGIN supra note 1, at 257, 259.
58. GAO, supra note 37, at 17; see also TAVERNE, supra note 56, at 110.
59. GAO, supra note 37, at 17-18; see also TAVERNE, supra note 56, at 110-11.
60. See M.A. Adelman, Worldwide Oil and Gas: Permanent Instability, in WORLD ENERGY
MARKETS: STABILITY OR CYCLICAL CHANGE? 119-21 (William F. Thompson & David J. DeAngelo,
eds. 1985); see also YERGIN, supra note 1, at 714-18.
61. See Adelman, supra note 60, at 111-12; see YERGIN, supra note 1, at 712.
62. See William L. Fisher, The Global Dimension of Oil: The Roles of the Three Critical Players,
25 TEX. INT'L L.J.389, 393 (1990).
63. See M. Michot Foss, Major Influences in the International Exploration Business, in
INTERNATIONAL OIL & GAS VENTURES: A BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE 12-13 (George E. Kronman, Don B.
Felio & Thomas E. O'Connor eds., 2000).
64. Seeid. at 16,17.
65. Col. Stanislav Lunev, Caspian Oil Could Reduce Our Dependence on Arab Oil,
NEWSMAX.COM(July 12, 2002) at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/7/1 2/174411 .shtml.
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depression through 1983.66 Clearly, the 1973 energy crisis shook the world market
and forced policy makers to reassess existing energy policies.67 For example, in
the wake of the increased political power of OPEC, both the Carter administration
and the Nixon administration, developed national energy policies aimed at
becoming independent of Middle Eastern oil.
68
As such, privatization became the vehicle through which to avoid reliance on
Middle Eastern oil. The world conflict over price, production, and demand
burdened the world oil market and further led to OPEC's loss of its controlling
share of the market. 69 OECD nations began to rely less on OPEC production as
substitute suppliers from non-OPEC countries emerged. 70 For example, in 1985
non-OPEC production reached a high of 71 percent of the total world oil market
and in 2003 accounted for 62 percent of world oil production. 71 The increase in
non-OPEC production between 1973 and 1983, although contributing to the
uncontrolled flow of petroleum to the market, also displaced the cartel influence
over production and price.72 This surge for a competitive global market place is
reflective of the importing country's desire to preserve energy security and reduce
reliance on OPEC supplies.
F. Modern Privatization Trends
Fossil fuels will account for 95 percent of global energy demand through
2020 and oil importing countries dependence upon Middle East supplies will
increase until and unless alternative sources are developed.73 As fewer discoveries
of giant fields are made it is likely that major consuming countries will once again
be reliant on Middle Eastern oil supplies.74 For instance, three oil discoveries
made in the last two decades, in Norway, Brazil, and Columbia are estimated to
produce roughly 200 thousand bpd. 75 These reserves will not meet the predicted
additional 50 million bpd consumption rate needed to meet new demands.76 Thus,
Middle Eastern reserves in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabia, and Iraq, will likely
be sought to meet world demand.77 Hence, the fact that reliance on Middle Eastern
66. See Adelman, supra note 60, at 114.
67. THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, ENERGY LAW & POLICY FOR THE 2117 CENTURY 20 (2000).
68. Id., ch.6 at 20-27.
69. YERGIN, supra note 1, at 718.
70. Attempts by the OPEC cartel to dictate price and production was circumvented by spot market
suppliers, which provided market stability. Adelman, supra note 60, at 119-121; see also YERGIN, supra
note 1, at 714.
71. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, NON-OPEC FACT SHEET at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nonopec.html (last modified June 2004) [hereinafter NON-OPEC];
see also ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, OPEC REVENUE FACT SHEET at
http://ww.eia.doe.gov/opecrev.html (last modified June 2004).
72. Verleger, supra note 44, at 132-35.
73. See THE WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 6 at 46.
74. See Engdahl, supra note 2; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 2 1, at 27-28.
75. See Engdahl, supra note 2.
76. See id.
77. Id.
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oil supplies is unavoidable, it follows that the political power struggles over price
and production are those challenges that Western importing countries seek to avoid
by privatizing world oil markets.
The uncertainty of price stability in the twenty-first century raises further
concern for Western reliance on the Middle East.78 Such conflicts work to the
disadvantage of western importing countries. Therefore, continued strategic
private development in non-OPEC markets, such as Canada, Russia, and Mexico,
should top the list of priorities for the current administration. Transnational
investment policy changes are reflective of the paradigm shift away from state
participation and toward privatization.79
The geo-politics of privatization requires a distinction between OPEC
producers and non-OPEC producing countries. Control over petroleum resources
in OPEC countries are typically held by government bodies such as State Owned
Enterprises, 80 while in most non-OPEC nations the industries are not state owned. 8'
Further, non-OPEC countries are seemingly more receptive to privatization, thus
making foreign direct investment (FDI) ventures with non-OPEC countries more
favorable. 82  Moreover, government controlled sectors tend to use petroleum
resources for political leverage rather than merely a tradable commodity.83 Such
practices conflict with international economic norms and the rule of law.84
G. A Globalized Energy Market Reduces Reliance on OPEC
Reliance on Middle Eastern oil supplies has long been a concern of the United
States and other importing countries, namely Western Europe and Japan.85 As the
historical accounts of the 1973 Oil Embargo attest, prior to petroleum
privatization, Western economies have been vulnerable to cartel influences. A
recent poll conducted by the Hudson Institute and pollster Frank Luntz indicate
that most Americans want to decrease reliance on Middle Eastern oil.86 In fact,
since September 11, Americans have become increasingly aware of the link
between oil and politics. 87 The Hudson-Luntz poll indicated that 83 percent of
Americans agree that "reducing our dependence on foreign oil must be a top
priority for the next administration' '88 and that the majority of Americans favor
78. SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 49.
79. Thomas Waelde, International Energy Investment, 17 ENERGY L. J. 191-93.
80. Economides & Kronman, supra note 53, at 42-43.
81. NON-OPEC, supra note 71.
82. See generally Foss, supra note 63, at 34-36.
83. Sovereign interests have been replaced by market-based economies. See e.g., Foss, supra note
63, at 34-35.
84. Jonathan Carlson, Answering Antiglobalist Angst, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & COTEMP. PROBS. 13,
14 (2002) (fearing that anti-globalist complaints about the loss of sovereignty will promote the
unilateral exercise of sovereign prerogative, unfettered by respect for international norms).
85. SAM H. SHURR & PAUL T. HOMAN, MIDDLE EASTERN OIL AND THE WESTERN WORLD:
PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS 1-5 (1971).
86. Randall Parker, Americans Want To Reduce Reliance on Middle Eastern Oil, PARAPUNDIT,
(Nov. 16, 2004), available at http://www.parapundit.com/archives/002460.html.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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reducing reliance on foreign oil over cheaper gasoline prices.89 The Hudson-Luntz
poll seems to indicate that many fear that reliance on Middle Eastern oil
jeopardizes national security and compromises the War on Terrorism.90
Recent counter-terrorism campaigns have left many with the belief that Arab
producing countries will respond to the War on Terrorism by launching an
embargo or drastically raising oil prices.91 Such fears are reminiscent of the
anxiety felt during the 1973 Oil Embargo.92 Yet, fears that the War on Terrorism
will affect an embargo are unwarranted. The interface between national security
and energy security should not cause such alarm because the advent of a globalized
energy market has displaced the control of OPEC with a competitive energy
marketplace.93 In a globalized petroleum industry, the Middle Eastern producing
countries can no longer dictate price and production without causing their own
economic suffrage.94  Globalization of the international petroleum industry,
therefore, creates a competitive global energy market place and results in equitable
economic security and mutual economic vulnerability for both producing countries
and importing countries alike.95 In short, producing countries must sell oil supplies
to sustain their own economies and can ill afford to allow politics to interfere with
their economic stability. 96 It follows that a globalized energy market provides
freedom to pursue national security policies without fear of a Middle Eastern oil
embargo or energy crisis.97
The globalization of the petroleum industry means the dispersing of power
over production and diversity among resource suppliers, resulting in a competitive
market place whereby one cartel can no longer control the fate of the world
market. As such, globalization reduced U.S. reliance on Middle Eastern oil and
created competition among oil-producing countries.98 The modem trend toward
globalization of the petroleum sector stems from the privatization of non-OPEC
markets during the later decades of the twentieth century.99 Prior to the emergence
of petroleum privatization, OPEC member states had a stronghold on world supply
and production which left importing countries vulnerable to both energy and
economic crisis.'0
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Donald Losman, Oil Denial: An Empty Fear, CATO INST., Oct. 13, 2001, available at
http://www.cato.org/dailys/10-13-01 .html.
92. Id.
93. Bill Richardson & Thomas F. McLarty III, OPEC's Clout isn't what it used to be, (Nov. 4,
2001) available at http://www.oilcrisis.com/debate/richardson.htm.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Losman, supra note 91.
97. Richardson & McLarty, supra note 93.
98. Id.
99. See generally Foss, supra note 63, at 11-17.
100. See generally id. at 18, 25-26 (discussing the impact of OPEC decision-making regarding
price and production, on the world market. Foss further asserts that Non-OPEC markets defuse the
once dominant position of the cartel).
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Privatization is a rapidly growing phenomenon and touches many once
nationalized or state-owned core industries. Between 1988 and 1993, nearly three
thousand state-owned enterprises in over ninety-five countries were transferred to
private ownership.' 0 ' Yet unlike the privatization of a country's telecommunication
system or water purification system, the privatization of a nation's petroleum
industry is seldom without political significance. Most oil producing countries
hold strong nationalistic ties to their petroleum resources, 0 2 making the transfer of
ownership to private companies a reluctant national process.
Privatization is but one facet of a global economy, yet without private
ownership or at least significant private participation, Western nations are left
without recourse and are vulnerable to host government influences. Not
surprisingly, multinational oil companies and Western states, interact with host
country governments in manners that have less to do with economic transactions as
they do with the geopolitics of petroleum.'0 3 Geopolitical interactions with host
countries have historically been disruptive to the world market and in some cases,
resulted in severe economic crisis. °4 In this author's view, the intensity of
geopolitical interactions around downstream activities is precisely the motivation
for the evolution of international petroleum privatization.
H. Primary Petroleum Consumers
The shift from OPEC reliance is most prevalent amongst the primary
petroleum consumers. The OECD, for example, was formed by Western countries
in response to the influence of the OPEC cartel.'0 5 The OECD nations and the
United States, consume the majority share of the oil market and as such, the
function of Western economies greatly depends upon the availability and stability
of fossil fuel resources.' 0 6 In 1999 Western countries accounted for 63 percent of
the world's oil consumption, 70 percent of which is imported from beyond its
borders.'0 7  OECD countries privatized their own once state-owned petroleum
enterprises, making petroleum privatization in OECD countries a model for the
subsequent demise of public ownership of core industries. 0 8 Countries such as
Norway, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Italy are exemplary of early petroleum
privatization. 10 9 In an effort to avoid reliance on OPEC and the Middle East,
OECD nations sought to form economic alliances with non-OPEC producing
101. GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY MARKETS, supra note 22, at 4.
102. See id.
103. Economides & Kronman, supra note 53, at 41, 42.
104. Id.
105. The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), formed the
International Energy Agency (lEA), aimed at taking measures to reduce its members' dependency on
the import of oil and to promote replacement by other energy sources. TAVERNE, supra note 56, at 121;
see also, SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 5-6; see also Waelde, supra note 79, at 212-13.
106. OECD nations include the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, Spain, Norway, and
initially the United States. Moreover, Western Countries and OECD are referred to interchangeably.
See TAVERNE, supra note 56, at 35; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 5.
107. Id.
108. See generally GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY MARKETS, supra note 22, at 3-12.
109. Id.
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nations in Latin America and CIS countries.110 By implementing policies and
practices of privatization in non-OPEC markets, OECD countries were able to
encourage host governments to reassess the efficiency of state operated petroleum
sectors."' In recent years, OECD nations implemented privatization efforts in the
Former Soviet Union, China, and Latin America, resulting in a competitive pool of
suppliers.'t 2 These privatization efforts proved to be a successful alternative to
reliance on OPEC oil and forced Saudi oil supplies to remain competitive with the
global market. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration and Mexican President
Vincente Fox have forged an alliance, which may bring increased private
investment in Mexico's tightly held state-owned market." 1
3
Similarly, non-OPEC countries like Norway and Russia have became viable
competitors in the globalized market, and thereby enhanced an efficient petroleum
industry and improved the overall security of energy resources." 4 As the world's
third largest oil exporter, Norway and the world's second largest oil producer,
Russia, these countries have almost completely privatized their industries. 15 Both
are cooperative with international bodies in the effort to modify local statutes
which once prohibited the exercise of private ownership." 16
These privatization efforts are significant in the advent of growing world
demands. The United States is the most mature oil basin in the world, but the
disparity between consumption and production has forced the United States into a
net importing nation." 7 The United States is the world's number one consumer of
crude oil while, historically, Japan and Russia followed respectively" 18 . Recently,
however, China has emerged as a major consumer and will join the United States
and Japan as one of the world's largest petroleum consumers." 9 In 2003, China
surpassed Japan as the second largest oil importer next to the United States.'2 °
Additionally, the growing middle class and rapidly growing economies in India
and China place a competitive demand on world supplies.
110. Id. CIS Countries refers to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
111. See generally OECD, PRIVATISING STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: AN OVERVIEW OF POLICES
AND PRACTICES IN OECD COUNTRIES (2003).
112. Several countries including Canada, France, Argentina, Italy, Bolivia, and Peru have policies
that facilitate the privatization of their petroleum resources. See generally GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY
MARKETS supra note 22, at 3-20.
113. Richardson & McLarty, supra note 93, at 2.
114. See id. .
115. GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY MARKETS, supra note 22, at 3-12.
116. See id.
117. Appenzeller, supra note 4, at 89.
118. Id. at 89.
119. Id. at 92.
120. Engdahl, supra note 2, at 4.
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As such, it will be difficult for future production rates to accommodate the
growing demand. China, for example, consumes 20 percent of total OECD
energy. 12 1  Together, India and China make up 2.5 billion of the world
population. 122 Clearly, the security of oil supplies will rapidly become a priority
for both governments.
However, the security of oil supplies is exacerbated by the geographic
localities of several Western powers. Western Europe and Japan, for example, are
geographically situated near present and former state owned petroleum producers
and thus are greatly impacted by OPEC market fluctuations. 123 Arguably, these
nations sought to secure imports through the formation of multilateral agreements.
The 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, for example, was created to encourage petroleum
trade between OECD and CIS countries. 124 As a result, the Energy Charter Treaty
provides alternative petroleum suppliers for OECD countries and therefore less
reliance on Persian Gulf oil.
A similar trend exists in U.S. foreign policy. Prior to the Saudi Oil Embargo,
the United States maintained an exorbitant reliance upon OPEC imports. Since
then, the United States has diversified its imports. 125 From 1978 to 1990, Saudi
Arabia was primarily the top importer to the United States. 126 With the emergence
of private markets in Venezuela and Canada, reliance on imports from Saudi
Arabia decreased. In 1997, the top suppliers of oil to the United States were
Venezuela, Canada, and Saudi Arabia, respectively. 127  Presently, Canada has
emerged as the largest supplier of oil to the United States 128followed by Saudi
Arabia, Venezuela, Mexico, Nigeria, and Iraq respectively. 129 Canada's proven
reserves have been enhanced by including oil sands reserves in the estimates of
total Canadian crude oil reserves, thus placing Canada second only to Saudi Arabia
at 178.9 billion bbls. 130  Clearly, the Canadian private market places economic
pressure on OPEC members to circumvent the seepage of political ideologies into
market performances. Similarly, Canada has demonstrated her loyalty as an
exporting trade partner with the United States. In 2001, 99 percent of Canadian
crude oil exports were sent to the United States.'
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. SCHURR & HOMAN, supra note 85, at 23, 31.
124. Energy Charter Treaty 1994 signed by Western nations, Eastern European Countries and
members of the
Community of Independent States (CIS), recognizes sovereignty over natural resources but discourages
nationalization. SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 5-6; see also Waelde supra note 79, at 212-13.
125. THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, supra note 67, ch. 1, at 10.
126. EIA Annual Report to Congress 1980, vol 2, at 55, reprinted in THE ENERGY LAW GROUP,
ENERGY LAW & POLICY FOR THE 21 sr CENTURY, ch.7, at 10-11 (2000).
127. THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, supra note 67, ch. 1, at 11.
128. Alastair R. Lucas, Canada's Role In The United States' Oil and Gas Supply Security, 25
ENERGY L. J. 403,405 (2004).
129. See Losman, supra note 91, at 1.
130. Lucas, supra note 128, at 405.
131. Id. at 407.
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Currently, the Persian Gulf accounts for 27 percent of the world's oil supply
and holds over 66 percent of the world's proven reserves. 32 In an effort to avoid
Middle Eastern geopolitics and market disruption, importing countries anticipate
that new reserves will be found in the Caspian Sea.' 33 The Caspian Sea is believed
to hold the world's third largest petroleum reserve134and once unlocked could
dramatically reduce Western dependence on the Persian Gulf.135 The United States
and other Western countries hope to develop economic and political alliances with
the CIS countries of the Former Soviet Union as a means to develop the vast
potential of the Caspian Sea reserves.' 36 The Caspian Sea has become a central
focal point within the last fifteen years by Western capital, technology, and
diplomacy aimed at reducing reliance on the Middle East.' 3 7 Kazakhstan, holds
the Caspian Sea region's largest crude oil reserves, and is second only to Russia in
net exports from the region. 38  This explains the multitude of Western FDI
ventures that have persisted in that area.
Yet, others argue that the Caspian basin will not replace the need for Persian
Gulf oil.' 39 Recently, the Persian Gulf held roughly 600 billion barrels of oil and
1,600 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, whereas the Caspian basin only holds 28
billion barrels and 243 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.' 40 Moreover, Caspian Sea
production rates are expected to reach only four million bpd by 2015 as compared
to forty-five million bpd produced stemming from OPEC countries.'
4
'
Still, multinational oil companies have spent the past two decades attempting
to develop new oil fields that could potentially replace existing mature basins.
42
Between 1996 and 2002, major oil companies invested approximately $560 billion
in attempts to increase daily production. 43 Unfortunately, however, no significant
discoveries have occurred in over two decades.' 44 When the Hubbert Peak begins
to drastically effect economies, the private sector may begin to force the hand of
the National Forest Service by seeking to develop the reserves in the Artic
National Wildlife Reserve (ANWR). 45 Yet, developing ANWR will not solve the
132. Lunev, supra note 65.
133. See id. (asserting that Caspian oil will help lower the cost of any disruption from the Gulf); see
generally, Waelde supra note 79, at 191, 197, 210 (discussing the legislative challenges and promise of
petroleum investment in former socialist countries, referred to as CIS countries).
134. Lunev, supra note 65.
135. Id.
136. Id. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) includes: Russia, Asebajin, Kazakhstan,
Uzbekiastan, and Turkmenistan.
137. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, CASPIAN SEA REGION: COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.htm (2004) [hereinafter CASPIAN SEA].
138. 1d; see also ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, KAZAKHSTAN: OIL AND NATURAL GAS
EXPORTS (2002) at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabskazaexpo.html.
139. A Survey of Central Asia: A Caspian Gamble, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 1998, at 5-6.
140. Id.
141. CASPIAN SEA, supra note 137.
142. Engdahl, supra note 2, at 3.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Savinar, supra note 2 at 4.
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problem. ANWR only contains ten billion barrels of oil, which merely equates to
one year of current U.S. consumption. 146 Likewise, the development of oil shale
and tar sands are not yet economically efficient because of the amount of energy
required to develop those resources. Geologist, Dr. Walter Youngquist, informs us
that: "although US oil shales hold recoverable oil equal to more than 64 percent of
the world's total proven reserves, all attempts to get this oil out of the oil shale
have failed economically. Furthermore, the oil may be recoverable but the net
energy recovered may not equal the energy used to recover it.,,
147
I. Alternative Theories for the Modern Trend Toward Privatizing the
Petroleum Sector
Some scholars contend that other market forces lead to modem privatization
that have less political implications than this discussion asserts. 4 8 One view is that
venture capitalists sought increased profit returns through FDI projects in un-
mature basins.' 49 Still others view privatization as market reform. 150  Another
contention is that the emergence of natural 5 ' gas as a viable resource has altered
future reliance on crude oil generally. Possibly the strongest argument is that
privatization efforts is a direct result of a significant increase in available
technology. 52  New methods of gathering seismic data as well as innovative
production technologies have led to new discoveries and more production.
153
Likewise, the increase in technological exploration methods, led to more
possibilities of E&P ventures in historically difficult geographic regions such as
the Caspian Sea and the Former Soviet Union. 154 Thus, foreign investors are less
reluctant to pursue E&P ventures in non-traditional reserves.
Others argue that in the thirty years following the Oil Embargo, the shift from
OPEC was due to a decline in OPEC production quotas, thus reducing profits. 55
And that new reserves in non-OPEC regions would yield more favorable economic
return 156. Economists contend that low production levels and lack of resource
exploration contribute to investor's abandonment of OPEC regions.' 57  Yet,
collectively, OPEC members continue to hold the largest proven reserves in the
world.'58  Saudi Arabia alone has the highest production capacity. 159
146. Id.
147. Excerpt of geologist, Dr. Walter Youngquist reprinted in Savinar, supra note 2.
148. Foss, supra note 63, at 14.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 22-25.
152. Id. at 12-13.
153. See Wolfgang E. Schollnberger & Ronald A. Nelson, The Role of Technology in Modern
International Oil and Gas Exploration Strategies, in INTERNATIONAL OIL & GAS VENTURES: A
BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE, 99, 102-07 (George E. Kronman, Don B. Felio & Thomas E. O'Connor eds.,
2000); see also Foss, supra note 63, at 15-16.
154. See id; see also Foss, supra note 63, at 13.
155. See generally id., at 17, 27-28.
156. See generally, Economides & Kronman, supra note 53, at 41-46.
157. See Foss, supra note 63, at 14-15.
158. See TAVERNE, supra note 56, at 67-68.
159. See id.
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Comparatively, OPEC and the Middle East far surpass most non-member states in
reserves and production capacity with the Former Soviet Union, China, and
Mexico as the few exceptions.
60
Competing theories espouse that privatization stems from the decline of
socialism and the endorsement of free enterprise as a means to advance a nation's
wealth. 16' This theory is supported by the rapid growth in international trade
through the globalization of world economies. 62  Thus, it is urged that the
emergence of a global economy, coupled with the end of major socialistic regimes,
laid the foundation for the privatization of the energy market.' 63 Also, inefficiently
managed state-owned enterprises discovered that international competitiveness
was a key factor in a nation's ability to generate wealth.' 64
These alternative theories suggest that a historic change in attitudes toward
state ownership and a desire to become more internationally competitive drove the
evolution of privatization.' 65 Such may be the case for developed countries and for
countries whose national revenue is not dependent upon the export of oil. Yet, for
oil rich countries whose national identity and economy are defined by the
production and sale of oil, the analysis is quite different. In fact, in major
producing countries, nationalistic views and state ownership are emphatically
supported and explain why OPEC countries have resisted privatization trends.
Unlike globalization generally, privatization of the petroleum industry is not a
creature of profit maximization or market reform whereby western nations are
driven by an unquenchable thirst for capitalistic gains. Instead, the historic
geopolitical power struggles reveals that petroleum privatization coexists within
political structures and strategies aimed at securing nationalistic interests. It is
clearly a direct result of the 1973 Saudi-led Oil Embargo and the adverse unilateral
decision making of Middle Eastern sovereign powers. Where its effect may be
competitive market facilitation, petroleum privatization is a reflection of Western
energy polices aimed at reducing reliance on Middle Eastern oil and thereby
securing oil supplies. Furthermore, allegations that globalization imposes
capitalistic ideologies upon transition economies are not central to the discussion
of a global energy market. Far more is at stake here. Capitalistic ideologies serve
only as an infrastructure to implement the economic mechanisms of petroleum
privatization.
Petroleum as an energy resource has far greater significance than other global
commodities. 166 Because the dominant source of world energy is petroleum, the
absolute dependence of modem economies on fossil fuels will be greatly impacted
by the end of oil. 167 Worldwide dependence on non-renewable fossil fuels is
160. Id.
161. GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY MARKETS, supra note 22, at 3-7.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 3-12.
165. See id.
166. See generally YERGIN, supra note 1, at 715; see also Foss, supra note 63, at 30.
167. THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, supra note 67, ch.1 at 7.
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reflected in the daily uses and consumptions existing among industrial societies.'
68
For instance, transportation, electricity, heat, plastic products, agricultural
production, and other commercial distribution networks are all petroleum
dependent. 169 In short, every facet of modem life in industrialized societies is
powered by petroleum products. 170
J. Iraq and International Conflicts
Beyond the politics of price and production, conflicts and social instability
within OPEC member states further exacerbated the need to decrease reliance on
OPEC suppliers. Politics is often pervasive in international petroleum transactions
that involve sovereign state ownership of the minerals.'17  Political risk
assessments involving expropriation, unilateral host government actions, and
production must occur to ensure protection of foreign investments. 72 Iraq, under
the leadership of Saddam Hussein, has frequently threatened world production,
with a plethora of unilateral decisions which affected world supplies and foreign
relations. 173 U.S. relations with Iraq were amenable during the 1980 Iraq-Iran
war.174 Yet, these relations collapsed during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
175
The affect that Iraqi governmental instability has on the market is
demonstrative of need for private participation in producing countries. For
instance, during the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and the subsequent Persian Gulf War of
1991, several Kuwaiti oil fields were set afire, thus disrupting world oil supplies.
Fortunately, alternate suppliers eventually provided relief for the loss of production
during the Gulf conflict. 176  The ambitions of Saddam Hussein to become the
world's leading oil power, 177 is indicative of the unstable nature of global
transactions involving Middle Eastern producers. If the invasion of Kuwait had
been successful, Saddam Hussein arguably may have developed the financial
capacity to develop a formidable nuclear weapon. 178 The implications of which,
would have dramatically altered the balance of world power. 179 Additionally, the
loss of Iraqi production manifested by the U.N. plan and the imposed international
sanctions meant a shortage that other OPEC and non-OPEC countries must bear.'
8 0
168. Id.
169. See generally id.; see also Savinar, supra note 2, at 2.
170. See YERGIN, supra note 1, at 14-15; see also THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, supra note 67, ch. I at
7-8; see also Appenzeller, supra note 4, at 80-88.
171. Marlan Downey & Edwin Corr, Politics and International Exploration, in INTERNATIONAL
OIL & GAS VENTURES: A BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE 60-61 (George E. Kronman, Don B. Felio & Thomas
E. O'Connor eds., 2000).
172. Id.
173. In the 1970s, Iraq formed alliances with the then Soviet Union. Economides & Kronman,
supra note 53, at 43.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See generally Foss, supra note 63, at 26.
177. YERGIN, supra note 1, at 12.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Foss, supra note 63, at 26-27.
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More recently, allegations of corruption surrounding the "Oil for Food Program" in
Iraq cause further market disruption in that it may further hamper the re-entry of
Iraqi pre-war production levels.' 8'
Clearly the use of oil as a political weapon, along with the economic
instability resulting from price battles, internal conflicts, and instability within
OPEC nations, created an impetus for western nations to develop new markets to
rely.' 82 Yet despite the cartel's attempt to dictate price and production, the world
endured the 1973 and 1985 crisis through the use of standby suppliers and
demonstrates that there are sufficient reserves to meet world demand with less
reliance on OPEC. 83  As such, present privatization in non-OPEC nations
increases the vitality and stability of the oil market. Despite the inevitability that
non-OPEC producers will dry up, 184 increased technology will one day unlock the
vast resources of the Caspian Sea, creating sufficient relief for OECD nations
located near that basin.' 
85
In the years to come, natural gas will replace crude oil as the primary
hydrocarbon resource. 86 And although natural gas deposits are not concentrated
in OPEC regions, a vast amount of natural gas occurs there.' 87 No conclusion
should be reached that a return to reliance on OPEC nations is inevitable for
natural gas purposes. Instead, since most OPEC countries lack the requisite
technology or capital to develop their natural gas resources, most will rely on some
form of privatization to initiate production. 88 Similarly, the abundance of natural
gas in the United States will offset the potential for a Middle Eastern monopoly
over natural gas production.'
89
In summary, the private petroleum sector will continue to seek innovative
strategies to secure energy supplies and increase private participation in traditional
markets, and thereby reduce Western reliance on OPEC influence. The means by
which are subject to debate, yet privatization efforts have demonstrated that a
globalized energy market places pressure on otherwise unilateral geopolitical
strategies to conform to an equalized and cooperative world market.
181. See generally Claudia Rosett, Exposing the Rot Behind Oil for Food, NAT'L. POST, Mar. 3,
2005, at A19; see also Bill Nichols, Oil For Food Chief Undermined Integrity of U.N., USA TODAY,
Feb. 4, 2005.
182. See Foss, supra note 63, at 34-35.
183. See id.
184. Non-OPEC reserves are rapidly reaching maturity. Id. at 17.
185. See e.g., Frank C. Alexander, Jr., Caspian Petroleum Transportation and Contractual
Challenges, in INTERNATIONAL OIL & GAS VENTURES: A BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE 365 (George E.
Kronman, Don B. Felio & Thomas E. O'Connor eds., 2000).
186. See Foss, supra note 63, at 22-25.
187. See TAVERNE, supra note 56, at 69-70, tbl. 2.20.
188. See Foss, supra note 63, at 13.
189. United States natural gas reserves supply 25 percent of the nation's domestic energy
requirements. G. Warfield Hobbs IV, The United States Has Abundant Natural Gas Resources: It
Lacks Only the Public Will to Develop Them, Testimony Presented to the United States Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (July 26, 2000), available at
http://dpa.aapg.org/testimoneis/2000/000726_senate-gwh.cfm.
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II. PRODUCING COUNTRIES: ECONOMIC RELIANCE & VULNERABILITY
Privatization, along with economic globalization, exists along an intensely
polarized continuum, between sovereignty and private ownership, separating
private sector outlooks and anti-globalist rhetoric. In the case of petroleum
privatization, the intersection of national sovereignty and globalization collide
along a variety of geo-political lines enmeshed with energy demands and economic
power. Thus, countervailing camps are often uncompromisingly opposed to each
other. And motives and ideologies of respective counterparts are emphatically
conclusive. Considering that 99 percent of the world's oil stems from only forty-
four countries, twenty-four of which are past their peak, including the United
States, Russia, and the United Kingdom,' 90 Part II of this discussion examines the
socioeconomic norms and viewpoints of producing countries in reaction to the
encroachment of petroleum privatization.
A. Privatization and Economic Reliance
In addition to the geopolitics steering Western countries away from their
reliance on Middle Eastern petroleum, the second critical factor driving
international petroleum privatization is born within the producing countries
themselves. That factor is the exclusive economic reliance on petroleum revenue
by producing nations.
Depending upon which vantage point petroleum privatization is viewed, the
economic disparity among producing nations could have several implications. One
might perceive that privatization exploits economically vulnerable states, or that it
is an imperialistic cloud over sovereign resources. Others may view the trend as
an economic opportunity for transition economies. Whichever the chosen
perspective, present economic stagnation, emphatically leaves producing countries
vulnerable to foreign ownership and in need of foreign investment to promote
economic growth.
For petroleum producing countries, the threat of petroleum privatization is
less a creature of imperialistic globalization, but rather a product of national debt,
economic disparity, and above all the producing countries' excessive reliance on
petroleum export revenue.
B. Privatization Defined
Privatization is a capital venture in a market-driven economy by profit-
seeking companies who enter national economies and replace state ownership and
control with private ownership and control. 191 These profit-seeking companies are
typically representative of Western countries and foreign to the nation state.
In her article The Selling of Argentina: Is the Path to the First World
Privatized?, Carla Davidovich outlines factors that suggest both the benefits and
burdens of privatization. 192 She suggests that privatization: (i) increases efficiency
190. Savinar, supra note 2.
191. SMITH ETAL.,supra note 2l, at 379.
192. Carla Davidovich, The Selling of Argentina: Is The Path to the First World Privatized?, 28
LAW& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 154, 163-70 (1996).
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of the industry; (ii) reduces the government's role in the economy; (iii) maximizes
use of natural resources; and (iv) introduces capital flow to the government and
increases technological capacity. 93 However, she also notes that privatization
creates: (i) an increase in unemployment; (ii) decrease in the power of labor
unions; (iii) the states loss to all future revenue; and (iv) fosters public resentment
of foreign ownership.
194
Privatization, as a form of market facilitation, clearly coexists with private
economic mechanisms, yet has implications of denationalization and trade
liberalism that often conflict with sovereign interests.
C. Fear of Privatization
Anti-globalist fear that privatization of the petroleum industry is an
implication of a loss of sovereignty over natural resources, deregulation of national
policies, and a reduction in state revenue. The views of world bodies concerned
with the trend of privatization were reflected at two international conferences. The
International Conference on the Impact of Globalization on Middle East Oil &
Gas Industry, sponsored by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), held on
July 23, 2003,'9' discussed the effects and implications of the World Trade
Organization, deregulation, and the impact of privatization on the Middle Eastern
Petroleum Industry. In April 2004, the University of Maryland held a symposium
titled, Globalization and Nigerian Oil that discussed among other things, the
international political economy and international negotiations.'
96
These international conferences reflect a concern that privatization implies a
return to imperialistic conditions previously experienced in the first half of the
twentieth century. Furthermore, many fear that privatization affects a retreat from
national identity and self-determination. 97 Moreover, because most producing
countries were at some point under imperial or colonial rule, privatization
increases domestic resentment of foreign intervention and control.1 9i
From the host country perspective, privatization often means a loss of
sovereignty. Under the umbrella of economic globalization, privatization asserts
pressure for the deregulation of markets, economic sectors, and national borders. 199
It entails a transformative process of the state, which extends well beyond the loss
of power. 20 0 As such, privatization installs private actors and thereby affects de-
nationalization. 20  Keep in mind, however, that most of the major petroleum
193. Id..
194. Id.
195. The Impact of Globalization on Middle East Oil and Gas Industry, Exhibits and Conferences,
National Iranian Oil Company (July 23, 2003) available at http://www.nioc.com/exhibit/.
196. Globalization and Nigerian Oil, Icons Project, University of Maryland (Apr. 2004) available
at http://www.icons.umd.edu/pls/staff/website.simulation-description?v-sim-type-id= 7.
197. See generally, Sakia Sassen, State & Economic Globalization: Any Implications for
International Law?, I CHI. J. INT'L 109, 110 (2000).
198. Davidovich, supra note 192, at 168.
199. Sassen, supra note 197, at 109-10.
200. Id. at 110.
201. Id. at 111.
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producers; Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Mexico, Venezuela, and
Nigeria have resisted full scale privatization. 20 2 In fact, most of the producing
nations maintain a state-owned enterprise system whereby all royalties, revenue
stemming from the petroleum industry, goes directly to the central or federal
government. As one writer states: "most state-owned petroleum enterprises have
remained immune to privatization trends. 2 °3 In fact, many former communist
countries and some Latin American countries restrict foreign investment projects
204to Joint Venture agreements with a national oil company.
D. Privatization and the Loss of Sovereignty
There are different ways to view the effects of privatization on state-owned
petroleum enterprises, primarily because there are different methods of
privatization, 20 5 all of which do not lead to a complete loss of state control,
participation, or revenue. Obviously, most sovereign nations are resistive to the
implications of a Total Sale of Assets (TSA) and Acquisition model. Other models
such as the Joint Venture and the Lease and Management Contracts prove more
palatable to some producing countries with transition economies.20 6
The TSA model is best exemplified by the Argentina projects. Argentina
privatized its petroleum industry in 1993 .207 The oldest-state owned petroleum
company in Latin America, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF), was sold to a
Spanish company Respol.2 ° 8 In 1993, Argentina's natural gas company, Gas de
Estado (GdE) was sold and divided into ten private companies few of which
occurred through employee buyout programs.2 °9  In return, the Argentine
government received over $22 billion. In 2003, a Brazilian company, Petrobas,
acquired a majority stake in Perez Companc, another large oil company in
Argentina. By the end of 2003, Argentina's entire petroleum industry had become
privatized.21 °
Other forms of privatization, which often have fewer implications of foreign
dominance and serve as beneficial economic mechanisms for transition economies,
include the Joint Venture agreement. 21 1 The Joint Venture model, which is
202. Waelde, supra note 79, at 193-96.
203. Keith J. Russell, Time Is Now for Full Privatization of PEMEX, 20 HOus. J. INT'L L. 176
(1997).
204. GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY MARKETS, supra note 22, at 7.
205. Id. at 37-55.
206. Id.
207. SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 383.
208. Id. at 384. See also, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ARGENTINA, COUNTRY
ANALYSIS BRIEF, (2005) available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/argentna.html [hereinafter
ARGENTINA].
209. See Anna Gelpern & Malcolm Harrison, Recent Development, Ideology, Practice and
Performance in Privatization: A Case Study of Argentina 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 240, 243 (1992).
210. ARGENTINA, supra note 208.
211. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN NIGERIA 33, 34 (1994).
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essentially a partial sale of assets, provides investment opportunities for foreign
investors while simultaneously supporting economic and technological growth
211
among host countries.
For example, Joint Venture agreements account for 95 percent of Nigeria's
crude oil production.21 3  One such Joint Venture agreement involves the
development of the West African Pipeline, entered into by the Nigerian National
Petroleum Company (NNPC), Shell and ChevronTexaco.2 14 ChevronTexaco holds
36 percent interest, Shell 18 percent, Ghana Volt River Authority 16 percent, and
the NNPC 25 percent. 215 The project serves multiple purposes. On the one hand,
it rids Nigeria of its gas flaring dilemma, which results in traumatic environmental
and health problems.2 16 Secondly, the West African Pipeline will spark economic
growth for Nigeria and ECOWA member states.217
Other major producing countries appear open to limited levels of foreign
investments. For example, Mexico PEMEX and Venezuela PDVSA have provided
limited opportunities for foreign direct investment.21 8 Neither state appears willing
to provide opportunities with any resemblance to the Argentine model.
The PEMEX, NNPC, and PVDSA contracts appear to serve the interest of
both sides of the debate. Each allows foreign investors the opportunity to expand
economic ventures while simultaneously increasing the financial viability of the
nation. Similarly, because many producing countries lack either the technology,
capital, or expertise to develop or expand the production of their petroleum
resource, private foreign investment is a means to utilize the resources, and thus,
create a capital base for the country.219Under the PEMEX, NNPC, and PVDSA
model, nations are able to maintain sovereignty over their resources and maintain
212. Id.
213. THE CWC GROUP, NIGERIA OIL AND GAS (NOG) 2004 (2004), at
http://mbendi.co.za/cwc/confs/nog2003/index.htm.
214. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, WEST AFRICAN GAS PIPELINE PROJECT (2003) at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/wagp.html [hereinafter WEST AFRICAN GAS].
215. Id.
216. In 1999, Nigeria flared more gas than any other country in the world. Nigeria and the
multinational oil companies in the region, including Shell, committed to the elimination gas flaring by
2008. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH GROUP, THE PRICE OF OIL 24 (1999); see also NIGERIAN NATIONAL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, NIGERIAN GAS COMPANY LIMITED: AN NNPC SUBSIDIARY (2002) at
http://www.nnpc-nigeria.com; see also SHELL NIGERIA, GAS FLARING, at
http://www.shell.com/home/Framework?siteld=nigeria&FC2=/nigerialeftnavs/zzz Ihn7_4-0 (last
visited Apr. 5, 2005).
217. ECOWA, the Economic Community of West African States, includes Chad, Cameroon, Togo,
Ghana, Nigeria, and other West African countries. WEST AFRICAN GAS, supra note 214.
218. For privatization under the PEMEX model, see generally, SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at
385-88. For privatization efforts in Venezuela, see generally Brian Hale, Analysis: Venezuela's Oil
Industry, Dec. 6. 2002, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/2549589.stm.
219. SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 55; see also GLOBALIZATION OF ENERGY MARKETS supra
note 22, at 3-12.
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state participation. In addition, these models further allow the host countries to
increase their technical and managerial skills, which can ultimately lead to self
reliance and a self sufficient state-owned company. °
E. Debt and Economic Disparity
In the wake of the privatization era, one of the greatest dilemmas facing
producing countries is the ability to satisfy insurmountable foreign debt. In a
declining economy foreign debt is possibly the single most crucial factor which
incites a producing country to privatize its petroleum industry. Largely because in
a state-driven economy the government revenue has the responsibility of sustaining
all aspects of national needs. 22 1 Export revenue is distributed among social and
economic programs including, health, education, and other core industries, making
it difficult to balance the demands of competing economic burdens.222
Foreign debt owed by many of the producing countries to the World Bank or
foreign governments, stem from receipt of foreign aid, export credits, loans from
other governments and IFC loans.2 3 External debt poses a serious problem for
producing countries because (i) the loan must be repaid in hard currency, (ii) the
country must pay debt servicing cost, (iii) historic debt relief and debt rescheduling
programs only prolong the life of the loan thereby increasing the total amount paid
over a period of time, and (iv) debt export ratios are often disproportionate,
creating financial dilemmas in declining economies.224
Producing countries, like other Lesser Developed Countries, must repay their
foreign debt in hard currency. 225 This is a difficult task when a producing
country's debt export ratio is disproportionate. When export revenue is down or
stagnant, the ability to pay debt servicing costs puts a daunting strain on the
national economy.226 Therefore, many producing countries seek alternative
repayment methods such as debt rescheduling. This alternative, however,
227increases the total amount needed to satisfy the loan and hence debt increases.
Faced with this financial dilemma, along with the responsibilities for the overall
economic and social well-being of the state, governments often seek privatization
as a means to satisfy foreign debt and increase economic growth.228
220. DOING BUSINESS iN NIGERIA, supra note 211, at 33-34.
221. Persian Gulf States Country Studies: Kuwait Society, COUNTRY STUDIES.COM at
http://www.country-studies.com/persian-gulf-states/kuwait---society.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
222. Id.
223. The Third World Debt Crisis, NEW INTERNATIONALIST MAGAZINE (1998) [hereinafter The
Third World Debt Crisis].
224. Id; see generally, Anup Shah, Debt and the Global Economic Crisis, in THIRD WORLD DEBT
UNDERMINES DEVELOPMENT available at
http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Debt/EconomicCrisis97.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
225. See The Third World Debt Crisis, supra note 223; see also Anup Shah, Causes of the Debt
Crisis, in THIRD WORLD DEBT UNDERMINES DEVELOPMENT available at
http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Debt/Causes.asp (last updated October 5, 2004).
226. See The Third World Debt Crisis, supra note 223; see also Shah, supra note 225.
227. See The Third World Debt Crisis, supra note 223; see also Shah, supra note 225.
228. Privatization was a vehicle by which Argentina, for example, reduced foreign debt, reduced
inflation and provided the government with a large influx of capital. See Davidovich, supra note 192, at
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For instance, prior to privatization, Argentina was in steep economic crisis,
with foreign debt in excess of $45 billion.229 The backlash of the economic crisis
in 1980 left Argentina crippled with foreign debt. In 1985, Argentina began
privatizing its core industries.230 In 1991, President Memem's "Argentina Plan"
opened the state-owned petroleum sector to foreign direct investment ventures.231
From the earnings made through completely privatizing state-owned enterprises,
Argentina reduced its foreign debt by twelve billion dollars.232
When a government no longer has the resources to sustain or develop their
state- owned enterprises and experiences a decline in export revenue, the potential
to default on foreign loans becomes apparent. Mexico, for example, defaulted on
its loan with the World Bank in 1982 due to a decline in decline in export revenue
and profit.233 In 1993, the government adopted a Foreign Investment Law, aimed
at encouraging foreign investment in Mexico's petroleum industry.234
Another example is seen in Nigeria, which has $30 billion in foreign debt.235
Recently, the president of Nigeria, Obasanjo, made a plea to the international
community to cancel its foreign debt. Obasanjo insisted that debt relief was not
sufficient, that his country was in a state of economic depression, and the only
solution is debt cancellation.236
Discussions condemning the World Bank, IMF, and the HIPC 237 programs are
beyond the scope of this discussion, but have thematic relevance bearing on the
decision to privatize a core industry when faced with insurmountable foreign debt.
In many cases, a country allocates more of its revenue to debt servicing costs than
they are able to allocate to social and economic development programs. 238 Hence,
when faced with looming foreign debt and debt servicing costs, a country is
increasingly unable to sustain state-owned enterprises. Accordingly, privatization
is often the sole economic solution.
165-66.
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230. SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 384.
231. Id.
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233. See Shah, supra note 225; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 21, at 387.
234. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 387 (2d ed. 2000).
235. JUBILEE RESEARCH, NIGERIA (2000), at
http://www.jubileeplus.org/jubilee2000_archives/nigeria.htm; but see CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK, NIGERIA, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ (last
visited Apr. 15, 2005) [hereinafter THE WORLD FACT BOOK].
236. Press Release, Jubilee 2000, President Obasanjo Appeals For Immediate Debt Relief for
Nigeria (Mar. 23, 2000), at
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237. HIPC is an acronym for "Heavily In-debt Poor Countries" initiative.
238. See JOHN SERIUEX &YIAGADEESEN SAMY, THE NORTH-SOUTH INSTITUTE, THE DEBT
SERVICE BURDEN & GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM LOW INCOME COUNTRIES (2001), available at
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Nigeria is a prime example. Despite the fact that Nigeria is the world's eighth
largest oil producer,239 the largest petroleum producer in Africa, and the fifth
largest U.S. supplier,240 Nigeria is among the poorest countries in the world.24'
Nigeria has four oil refineries: Port Harcourt I & II, Warn, and Kaduna, and in
1999 the four refineries combined operated at less than 38 percent capacity.242 In
2003, the four refineries reportedly operated well below their utilization capacity.
Kaduna operated a 31 percent capacity, Warri at 48 percent, and Port Harcourt I &
II at 60 percent utilization capacity. 243 Consequently, Nigeria functions as a net
importer state.2 " Unmercifully, imported refined oil is purchased in hard
currency.245 Traditionally, downstream activities were reserved to the state. 246 But
the lack of investment capital needed to revive the four refineries forced Nigeria to
enter into Joint Venture agreements with Shell and other multinationals.247
Presently, Nigeria has a privatization plan, offering 51 percent foreign ownership
in her petroleum sector and in some cases 100 percent private ownership.248 Such
decisions conflict with the historic exercise of unilateral sovereign prerogatives
and directly correlate with the burdens of external debt.
Other producing countries with large external debt include: Qatar with $15.4
billion, Mexico with $150 billion, Venezuela with $38 billion, Indonesia with $131
billion, and Iraq with $120 billion.249 As long as producing countries lack the
economic capacity to reduce external debt, the potential for foreign direct
investment as a means to stimulate state economies remains an unavoidable reality.
F. Reliance of Oil Revenue: An Imbalanced Economic Strategy
Each producing country has its own unique geopolitical paradigm by which
they participate in the international petroleum industry. Some have common
threads of colonial or imperialistic rule. Others have transition stages of military
239. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF, NIGERIA (2004),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/nigeria.html [hereinafter NIGERIA]
240. Id.
241. Ike Nijaman, Nigeria Is A Poor Country, ZNETAFRICA (Nov. 18, 2003) at
http://www.zmag.org/content/print article.cfm?itemlD=4516&sectionlD=2.
242. VIATON, NIGERIAN OIL & GAS ONLINE, DOWNSTREAM, at http://www.nigerianoil-gas.com
(last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
243. Id.; see also, Aluko Mobalaji, Fuel Subsidy, THE MORNING REPORT (July 9, 2003).
244. SHAHABUDDIN M. HOSSAIN, TAXATION & PRICING OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11 (IMF Working Papers No. WP/03/42, 2003), available at
http://.www.IMFPublications.org.
245. Id.
246. See Adedolapo Akinrele, The Nigerian National Petroleum Company at a Crossroads: An
Analysis of the Challenges of Funding, Commercialisation and Autonomy, I OIL, GAS & ENERGY L.
INTELLIGENCE 2 (Mar. 2003) available at
http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/article_43.htm.
247. See VIATON, supra note 242.
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rule and democratic rule. Others are plagued with war. Yet, all share one common
denominator: their absolute reliance on petroleum revenue.25 °
Hence to refer to producing countries as "oil rich countries" is a misnomer, as
few of the producing countries have any other significant export resources and
many are ranked among the poorest countries in the world.25' In a state-driven
economy, the reliance on a single source of revenue, dictated by fluctuations in the
petroleum market has dramatic results. As one scholar suggests: "When the price
of oil falls it creates real pain. They [producing countries] have to feed and give
welfare to their people, the same as Western countries." 252
In the typical producing country the state owned petroleum company,
generates 70 percent or more of its annual export revenue.253 For instance, in
Nigeria petroleum revenue accounts for 95 percent of its federal revenue. In
Venezuela, petroleum accounts for one-third of its GDP, 80 percent of its export
earnings, and more than 50 percent of government revenue. In Kuwait petroleum
revenues comprise 95 percent of their export revenue and 80 percent of the
government revenue. Petroleum makes up 85 percent of Qatar's export earnings
and 70 percent of government revenue.254 This list is not exhaustive, but
representative of the extent to which producing countries rely on petroleum
revenue.
Reliance on single export revenue, in a state-driven economy, when viewed in
relation to population growth and budgetary restraints, places producing countries
in a uniquely vulnerable economic position. Petroleum, being the most actively
traded commodity on the world market, is highly susceptible to market
fluctuations. 25 5 Hence, the unpredictable nature of the petroleum market can have
an adverse impact on an exporting countries economy.256 In a given month, the
unstable petroleum markets, resulting from fluctuations in demand, production,
and price, can cause sporadic and declining petroleum revenues; thus, causing
economic demise among petroleum countries. And since petroleum countries are
concentrated in regions with low per capita income growth rates, 257 the economic
status of most producing countries does not avail itself to total reliance on the
revenue generated by petroleum.
250. According to Tony Scanlan, of the British Institute of Energy Economics, OPEC countries
cannot afford to treat oil as just another commodity. OPEC: The Oil Cartel in Profile, Feb. 12, 2003,
BBC NEWS, at http://new.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/3768971 [hereinafter BBC, The Oil Cartel].
251. Id.
252. Id. (quoting Tony Scanlan).
253. When averaged, the World Fact Book and Energy Information Administration export revenue
data reflect that petroleum revenue makes up 70 percent of the country's export revenue. See THE
WORLD FACT BOOK, supra note 235.
254. Id.
255. Oil Markets Explained, July 14, 2003, BBC NEWS [hereinafter BBC NEWS].
256. BBC, The Oil Cartel, supra note 250; see generally BBC NEWS, supra note 255.
257. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L. STUDIES, OIL CRASH & OIL
BOOM (2001); see also DAN BEN-DAVID, ET AL, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: SPECIAL STUDIES,
TRADE, INCOME DISPARITY AND POVERTY 2, tbl.la (2003). Latin America, the Middle East, North
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G. Economic Growth Through Economic Diversity
In light of the assertions that liberalism is a tool which brings wealth to the
wealthy nations and market exploitation of the poorer nations, one concept is clear.
Those nations which have grown faster have: (i) diversified their economy, (ii)
practiced liberalism, and (iii) developed an industrial market, which in turn
resulted in manufactured exports.258 This section does not dispel or support
theories of global trade regulations or liberalization. Here, the attempt is merely to
demonstrate how trade positively impacts economic growth.
This discussion suggests that producing countries should examine the
economic strategies of export led economies, particularly that of developing Asia.
Combined, developing Asia accounted for 18.5 percent of exports among
developing countries in 1990.259 Similarly, developing Asia held 59 percent of the
share of exports to the world and 67 percent among developing countries in
1990.260 Developing Asia has since been the largest exporter among developing
countries. 261 Increased export earnings are largely due to exportation of
manufactured goods and refined merchandise, while other non- manufactured
primary products account for only 20 percent of their overall exports.262 By
contrast, international exports have fallen in the oil producing regions such as,
Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.263 In fact, the Middle East and Africa
have not expanded their share of merchandise exports and export few
manufactured goods.26
On average, the highest growth rates were recorded in high-tech categories,
whereas resource based products were among the lowest.265 Petroleum countries
with low exports of non-petroleum products, may explain why these countries
26
experience economic growth rates below the global average. 66 Without
manufactured merchandise to place on the market, reliance on petroleum revenue
exacerbates the need to stimulate economic growth through privatization.
H. Globalization and Trade Leverage
In the wake of liberalism, reciprocal trade barriers are now being relaxed,
allowing opportunities for developing countries to actualize trade income in the
world market. In the 1990s, trade liberalization has resulted in high instances of
economic growth for those countries with internal strategies and resources to
258. T. Ademola Oyejide, Low Income Developing Countries in the GA7T WTO Framework, in
FROM GATT TO THE WTO: MULTILATERAL TRADING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 115, 117-121
(ed.WTO Secretariat 2000).
259. See MARC BACCHETTA & BUrT BORA, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, INDUSTRIAL TARIFF
LIBERALIZATION AND THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 1,2 (2003).
260. Id. at 3.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 3.
264. See id.
265. Id. at 2.
266. Out of 144 developing countries, only 54 countries recorded an export expansion above the
global average, while 90 developing countries recorded below average growth. BACCHETrA & BORA,
supra note 259, at 3.
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capitalize on the free market access. 267 Hence, the implications under a global
trade environment have the potential to increase national income and thus reduce
economic disparity.
The theory that a Global Trade system will be mutually rewarding and
thereby spark economic growth, questions whether open trade policies promote
economic growth. According to T. Ademola Oyejide, "[t]hose that do grow used
trade opportunities. Those that created trade barriers declined., 268 If the key to
alleviate poverty is through economic growth, and, if the key to economic growth
is in having an export led economy, then it follows that in order for producing
countries to sustain economic growth they must develop competitive export
products.269
To withstand further vulnerability to petroleum privatization and to create
economic growth, producing countries need to develop internal economic
infrastructures that facilitate an export-led economy. Internal economic
infrastructures work to increase local consumption of products made within
national borders, and also provides an outward mechanism for transnational
activity.
Admittedly, issues of non-reciprocal market access and protectionism impact
the capacity of developing countries to fully participate in global markets. 270 Yet,
petroleum countries, unlike other developing countries, have decades of
transnational exposure and should be able to effect negotiation and terms.
Additionally, producing countries possess a vital export and should be able to
accomplish leverage through existing mechanism. Despite the challenges of a
rules-based system, petroleum countries, need take to heed to the proposition that
there is a link between trade and economic prosperity. Although many
socioeconomic realities contribute declining economic conditions, global trade
arguably increases a countries earning capacity. Hence, the question of export
diversity hinges on economic resources and national trade policies.
III. GLOBALIZING THE PETROLEUM MARKET: GOOD FOR WHOM?
A. Privatization: A Mutually Beneficial Policy Choice
Privatization as both a political and economic strategy provides mutually
beneficial outcomes for petroleum countries and consumers. Yet, full scale
privatization, whereby a nation liquidates 100 percent of its petroleum industry, is
likely more beneficial to the foreign investor, and merely achieves short term goals
for the petroleum country. For example, Argentina liquidated all of its core
industries, yet defaulted on its $145 billion dollar loan in December 2001, and in
2004, Argentina's external debt stood at $155 billion.27' Other methods of
267. Oyejide, supra note 258.
268. Id.
269. See id.
270. BACHETrA & BORA, supra note 259, at abstract. The issues for LDCs are the degree of
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developing country markets.
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privatization seem to serve the interest of foreign investments as well as
nationalism. First, transition economies are able to capitalize on the influx of
technological and managerial expertise.272 These countries are then, theoretically,
able to increase their participation in global markets. Thirdly, foreign investment
allows undercapitalized economies to develop unutilized natural resources. Fourth,
producing countries are introduced to Westernized business strategies, which if
subsequently applied, help further their capacity to develop economic
infrastructures and overall economic performances.
For importing nations, the globalization of the energy market has affected
market facilitation and market stability.273 As a policy choice, privatization served
to decrease anxieties surrounding the exercise of cartel influence on price and
production.274 Yet given the unavoidable return to reliance on Middle Eastern oil
supplies, the question is whether the Middle East will act as a stable supplier of
petroleum at market driven prices.275
B. The Collision Between Geopolitics and Declining Fuel Supplies
In the wake of the end of the Oil Era, the question is whether disruptive
geopolitical encounters will yield to the urgency of petroleum depletion, or will
unilateral decision making once again dictate market stability. In the coming
decades, the clash between nationalistic views, global economic trends, and
increased energy demands, will bring to the fore, an "epic quest" for control over
world oil supplies. 276 This quest for remaining oil supplies will result from the
increasing awareness of the finite nature of already declining oil resources.
Similarly, increased global demand will heighten the already intense battle to
secure oil imports.
To avoid international conflict, multilateral efforts should be exercised in
resolving hierarchical relations between consumption demands and sovereign
interests. International legislative bodies such as the United Nations and the
International Court of Justice must play a formidable role in the development of
international strategies aimed at increasing equitable relations among competing
national interests. Moreover, international energy policies which contemplate less
dependence on liquid petroleum will assist in circumventing global confrontations.
Although recent history reinforces pessimistic outcomes, multilateral
cooperation is imperative in circumventing global crisis. Clearly, petroleum
resources will be the focal point of international policies in the coming decades.
As such, any multilateral energy plan implemented by global powers must address
http:// www.chioke.org/nuevo-eng/informes/2753.html; see also Peter Calvert, Argentina: The Crisis of
Confidence, DEPT. OF POLITICS, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHHAMPTON (Apr. 2002).
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276. The phrase "epic quest" alludes to the title of Yergin's work, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR
OIL, MONEY AND POWER. See generally YERGIN, supra note 1.
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nationalistic concerns as well as Western economic objectives. Failure to do so
will only exacerbate an already critical situation. In short, global responses to the
eminent global energy crisis need not be antagonistic but instead reflective of
modem sociopolitical awareness and aptitude.

